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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,   ) 
     ) NO. 44373 
 Plaintiff-Respondent, )  
     ) TWIN FALLS COUNTY NO. CR 2013-242 
v.     ) 
     ) 
MICHAEL LANCE CARAWAY, ) APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
     ) 




STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
  
 Pursuant to a plea agreement, thirty-two-year-old Michael Lance Caraway 
pleaded guilty to felony aggravated battery.  The district court imposed a unified 
sentence of ten years, with three years fixed, suspended the sentence, and placed 
Mr. Caraway on probation for a period of four years.  After Mr. Caraway later admitted 
to violating his probation, the district court revoked his probation and retained 
jurisdiction.  Mr. Caraway participated in a “rider,” and the district court then suspended 
the sentence and placed him on probation for a new period of three years.  Mr. Caraway 
subsequently admitted to violating his probation, and the district court revoked his 
probation and retained jurisdiction.  The district court shortly thereafter relinquished 
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jurisdiction.  Mr. Caraway filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (“Rule 35”) motion requesting 
the district court reconsider its decision to relinquish jurisdiction.  The district court 
denied the Rule 35 motion.  On appeal, Mr. Caraway asserts the district court abused 
its discretion when it denied his Rule 35 motion. 
 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
 Officer Thiara of the Twin Falls Police Department responded to a reported fight 
in progress.  (Presentence Report (“PSI”), p.3.)  The reporting party stated a male, later 
identified as Mr. Caraway, was fighting with Thomas Coberly.  (PSI, p.3.)  Officer 
Schlund, the first officer at the scene, saw Mr. Caraway on top of Rodney Easter striking 
him in the face with a closed fist.  (PSI, p.3.)  Mr. Caraway initially refused orders to put 
his hands on top of his head or get on the ground, and continued to resist even after 
Officer Schlund placed him in cuffs.  (PSI, p.3.) 
 Officer Thiara spoke with Mr. Coberly, who reported someone had broken a 
window to his house.  (PSI, p.3.)  Mr. Coberly stated that when he opened his door to 
see what was going on, Mr. Caraway immediately punched him in the face.  (PSI, p.3.)  
As neighbors watched, the two fought in the hallway while Mr. Coberly called for help.  
(PSI, p.3.)  Mr. Coberly reported he gained control of Mr. Caraway, and Mr. Easter 
identified Mr. Caraway as “Mike.”  (PSI, p.3.)  Mr. Coberly stated Mr. Caraway and 
Mr. Easter began to fight, with Mr. Caraway striking Mr. Easter several times.  
(PSI, p.3.) 
 Mr. Coberly was covered in blood and had a deep gash on his forehead.  (PSI, 
p.3.)  Mr. Easter also had been bloodied on his face.  (PSI, p.3.)  Mr. Coberly was 
transported to the emergency room, where he received seven stiches, and he 
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additionally complained of head pain.  (PSI, p.3.)  He stated he would have to return for 
medical follow up to have his eye examined, because he had a metal plate in his face 
which may have also required treatment.  (PSI, p.3.) 
 The State charged Mr. Caraway by Information with one count of aggravated 
battery, felony, I.C. §§ 18-903(a)-(c) and 18-907(a).  (R., pp.40-42.)  Mr. Caraway 
initially entered a not guilty plea.  (R., p.57.)  The State later filed an Amended 
Information to add additional alleged injuries. (See R., pp.102-05.) 
 Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Caraway agreed to plead guilty by way of an 
Alford plea1 to the charge.  (R., pp.123-35.)  The State agreed to recommend the district 
court impose a unified sentence of ten years, with three years fixed, suspend the 
sentence, and place Mr. Caraway on probation.  (R., p.123.)  The district court accepted 
Mr. Caraway’s Alford plea.  (R., p.135.)  The district court subsequently imposed a 
unified sentence of ten years, with three years fixed, suspended the sentence, and 
placed Mr. Caraway on probation for a period of four years.  (R., pp.152-175.) 
 About one-and-one-half-years later, the State filed a Motion to Revoke Probation 
and Issue a Warrant, alleging Mr. Caraway had violated the terms of his probation.  
(R., pp.182-89.)  Mr. Caraway admitted to violating his probation by failing to report to 
the probation officer as directed, being evicted for not paying rent and not advising his 
probation officer of a new address, not making himself available for supervision and 
absconding supervision, being fired from his job, smoking marijuana, and failing to 
submit to random UAs as instructed.  (R., p.198; see R., pp.182-84.)  The district court 
revoked Mr. Caraway’s probation and retained jurisdiction.  (R., pp.199-203.)  After 
                                            
1 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
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Mr. Caraway participated in a “rider,” the district court suspended the sentence and 
placed him on probation for a new period of three years.  (R., pp.213-18.) 
 About two months later, the State filed a State’s Ex Parte Motion to Revoke 
Probation and Issue a Warrant, alleging Mr. Caraway had violated the terms of his 
probation.  (R., pp.219-30.)  Mr. Caraway admitted to violating his probation by failing to 
pay rent, failing to follow house rules, failing to check in for work, admitting to using 
marijuana, failing to appear for UA testing as directed, and absconding from 
supervision.  (R., p.240; see R., pp.220-21.)  The district court revoked Mr. Caraway’s 
probation and retained jurisdiction.  (R., pp.241-46.) 
 Mr. Caraway was placed in a traditional rider.  (R., pp.247-48.)  Shortly 
thereafter, rider program staff sent a letter to the district court “to update you as the 
reason to Mr. Caraway’s removal from the North Idaho Correctional Institution.”  (PSI, 
p.50.)  The letter stated that “through a fact finding investigation, it was discovered that 
Mr. Caraway was involved in two separate incidents that almost led to physical 
altercations.”  (PSI, p.50.)  The letter reported Mr. Caraway “was making harassing 
statements to another offender who happened to be a sex offender.”  (PSI, p.50.)  He 
allegedly “made a harassing statement calling this offender a ‘cho-mo’ . . . .”  (PSI, 
p.50.)  The letter further reported, “Mr. Caraway also admitted to making a threatening 
statement, something to the effect of, ‘Words like that will get the right side of your face 
introduced to the left side.’”  (PSI, p.50.)  The letter concluded:  “Due to Mr. Caraway’s 
behavior and threats toward a peer, he has been deemed a security risk; therefore, he 
has been transferred to the Idaho Correctional Institution—Orofino and is being 
recommended for relinquishment.”  (PSI, p.50.) 
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 Without conducting a rider review hearing, the district court then relinquished 
jurisdiction.  (See R., pp.249-52.)  The district court had reviewed the letter from rider 
program staff.  (R., p.250.)  The district court stated it “agrees that the defendant’s 
conduct indicates that the defendant is not a candidate for probation at this time.  Given 
the defendant’s behavior during the programming, and failure to complete it before 
being removed, it is apparent to the Court that the defendant is not adequately prepared 
to be successful on probation.”  (R., pp.250-51.) 
 Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35, Mr. Caraway filed a Motion for 
Reconsideration of Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction and Memorandum in Support.  
(R., pp.253-58.)  Attached to the Rule 35 motion was a letter by Mr. Caraway explaining 
“for the court his account of what happened during the incident with the individual he is 
accused of threatening (Mr. Trafford).”  (R., p.254, see R., pp.257-58.)2   
 The district court then entered an Order Denying Defendant’s I.C.R. 35 Motion 
Without a Hearing.  (R., pp.259-63.)  After reviewing the Rule 35 motion and attached 
letter, the district court was “not persuaded that the defendant is suitable for probation at 
this time.”  (R., p.261.)  The district court mentioned Mr. Caraway’s “lengthy criminal 
history,” which included violent conduct such the circumstances leading to the present 
charge of aggravated battery.  (R., p.261.)  The district court stated, “[h]is behavior on 
the rider, which the defendant regrets and attempts to mitigate in his letter, is in a similar 
violent vein even though it apparently did not actually rise to physical conduct.”  
(R., p.261.)  The district court concluded “this pattern of behavior poses a threat to the 
                                            
2 It appears that one of the three pages of the letter was inadvertently left out of the 
Clerk’s Record on Appeal.  The Rule 35 motion including the full letter is the subject of 
Mr. Caraway’s Motion to Augment, filed contemporaneously with this brief. 
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community and demonstrates that this defendant is not yet ready for probation.”  
(R., p.261.)   
 Mr. Caraway filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s Order 
Denying Defendant’s I.C.R. 35 Motion Without a Hearing.  (R., pp.264-67.) 
  
ISSUE 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Caraway’s Idaho Criminal 




The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Caraway’s Idaho Criminal 
Rule 35 Motion  
 
Mr. Caraway asserts the district court abused its discretion when it denied his 
Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence.  “A motion to alter an 
otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the sound discretion of the 
sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which may be granted if the 
sentence originally imposed was unduly severe.”  State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 251, 253 
(Ct. App. 1994) (citation omitted).  “The denial of a motion for modification of a sentence 
will not be disturbed absent a showing that the court abused its discretion.”  Id.  “The 
criteria for examining rulings denying the requested leniency are the same as those 
applied in determining whether the original sentence was reasonable.”  Id.  “If the 
sentence was not excessive when pronounced, the defendant must later show that it is 
excessive in view of new or additional information presented with the motion for 
reduction.”  Id.   
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Mr. Caraway submits the new and additional information he presented with his 
Rule 35 motion shows his sentence is excessive.  Specifically, Mr. Caraway in the 
Rule 35 motion and attached letter explained “his account of what happened during the 
incident with the individual he is accused of threatening (Mr. Trafford).”  (See R., p.254.)  
As stated in the Rule 35 motion, although Mr. Caraway “did use an inappropriate term, 
‘cho-mo’ to describe Mr. Trafford, Mr. Caraway assures that he was not the aggressor in 
the situation.”  (R., p.254.)  After another sex offender complained to Mr. Caraway that 
Mr. Trafford was harassing him, Mr. Caraway used the term “cho-mo.”  (R., p.254.)  
Mr. Trafford overheard the remark and “proceeded to challenge Mr. Caraway both 
verbally and physically.”  (R., p.254.) 
Mr. Caraway explained in the Rule 35 motion that he was walking away from the 
situation when Mr. Trafford verbally insulted him.  (See R., p.255.)  The Rule 35 motion 
stated that “Mr. Caraway’s remark in response to Mr. Trafford’s verbal assault, ‘words 
like that will get the right side of your face introduced to the left side,’ was not a threat, 
and was not intended as a threat.”  (R., p.255.)  Rather, the remark “was his opinion 
aimed at Mr. Trafford about the danger that Mr. Trafford’s verbal and aggressive 
behaviors could bring upon himself; not at the hand of Mr. Caraway but at the hand of 
others.”  (R., p.255.) 
The Rule 35 motion further explained Mr. Caraway had not started his 
programming at the time of the incident, and he “was walking away from the situation 
because he understood the risk of losing his rider and he was not willing to put his rider 
in jeopardy . . . .”  (R., p.255.)  Mr. Caraway also stated “he was honest with prison 
officials about what happened during the incident and cooperated during the 
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investigation,” and that he and Mr. Trafford “ironed out their differences later with each 
apologizing to the other.”  (R., p.255.) 
The above new or additional information presented with Mr. Caraway’s Rule 35 
motion shows his sentence is excessive.  Thus, Mr. Caraway asserts the district court 
abused its discretion when it denied his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion for a reduction 
of sentence.   
 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, Mr. Caraway respectfully requests that this Court reduce 
his sentence as it deems appropriate.   
 DATED this 16th day of November, 2016. 
 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      BEN P. MCGREEVY 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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